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Although the evolution of modern Hungarian national ideology from 
previous configurations of identification is marked by dramatic ruptures, the 
early modern frameworks of identity had a considerable impact on the outlook of 
modern national projects, both in terms of territorial imagery, codes of otherness 
and representations of the collective self1. It is commonly assumed that the most 
influential construction of identity in the early modern period was the so-called 
Hungarus-consciousness (based on a purportedly supra-ethnic and legalistic 
vision of political nationhood), identifying Hungarianness with the community 
of noblemen. The picture gets, however, more complicated if one recalls that 
besides this seemingly ‘color-blind’ conception of political nationhood another 
aspect of nationhood was also present (no matter how submerged at some point), 
stressing common ethnic origins, perceiving nationality along the lines of 
genealogical myths and the normative memory of past glories, and occasionally 
even identifying it with the linguistic community2.
1 The present essay draws on parts of my forthcoming book, The Terror of History. Visions of National 
Character in Interwar Eastern Europe.
2 On the early modern national consciousness in Hungary, the most original ideas were outlined 
by Jen� Sz�cs in his collection of essays. See his Nemzet és történelem (Budapest: Gondolat, 1974). This 
work is also available in German translation: Nation und Geschichte (Köln: Böhlau, 1981). See also, 
Antike Rezeption und Nationale Identität in der Renaissance in besondere in Deutschland und in Ungarn, 
Civilization and originality:





The variegated intellectual lineage of early modern political nationes was 
further complicated by the duality encoded in the emerging ‘nationalist’ discourse 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century: i.e. the fusion of the somewhat 
contradictory ideological projects of the Enlightenment and the emerging 
Romantic aesthetic and political doctrines3. It would be too simplistic to grasp 
this duality in terms of the binary opposition of universalism and particularism. 
If one turns to the most interesting cases, like Herder, for example, who stands 
with one foot in the Enlightenment and with the other in the sentimentalist Sturm 
und Drang discourse which we might describe as the precursor of Romanticism, 
one can see that the universalistic and the particularistic elements could coexist 
in a cult of authenticity. The overlapping of these canons calls our attention to the 
ideological complexity of the modern national discourses emerging in the first 
half of the nineteenth century in East Central Europe4. The elements of ethnic and 
supra-ethnic identity, the ambiguity of universalism and particularism all came 
to play their part in the emerging ‘liberal nationalism’ of the nineteenth century 
– these encoded contradictions made the tradition viable, structurally open to 
appropriation from different perspectives, but the very same heterogeneity made 
the new national discourse especially explosive. The emerging constructions of 
Hungarian ‘national character’ are indicative of these ambiguities. On the whole, 
the use of the concept of ‘national character’ or ‘national customs’ at the turn of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the symbolic negotiation 
over the limits of the national community and also the interplay of the idea 
of nationhood with the new vision of historical progress. It is indicative that, 
from the very beginning of its use, ‘national character’ appeared in the context 
of something rooted in history, in need to be protected against corruption. 
Symptomatically, already at this early point the cultivation of national character 
was linked with the program of linguistic Magyarization. This appears in the 
program of the first Hungarian-language cultural periodical Uránia (1794-95), 
edited by József Kármán and Gáspár Pajor, as well as in Kármán’s key work, the 
essay A’ Nemzet Tsinosodása (The refinement of the nation)5.
From the turn of the nineteenth century onwards, the influence of Herder 
became especially tangible all over Eastern Europe, contributing to the emergence of 
ed. Tibor Klaniczay (Budapest: Balassi, 1993); Katalin Péter, “A haza és a nemzet az ország három 
részre szakadt állapota idején”, in Papok és nemesek (Budapest: Ráday Gy�jtemény, 1995), 211-233. 
For a broader introduction to the history of political ideas in the early modern period in Hungary, 
see László Kontler and Balázs Trencsényi: “Hungary”, in., Religion, Law and Philosophy: European 
Political Thought, 1450-1700, eds. Glenn Burgess, Howell Lloyd (New Haven: Yale UP, 2008), 176-207.
3 On the problem of continuity see, most recently, Ambrus Miskolczy, A felvilágosodás és a 
liberalizmus között (Budapest: Lucidus, 2007).
4 Endre Bojtár, “Az ember felj�.” A felvilágosodás és a romantika a közép- és kelet-európai irodalmakban 
(Budapest: Magvet�, 1986).
5 József Kármán, A nemzet csinosodása (Budapest: Magvet�, 1981). Originally published: 1795, in 
vol. III of the magazine Uránia.
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a discourse of national specificity6. The most important features of the discussion on 
national specificity in the Hungarian context were, on the one hand, the shift from 
customs to language in defining the nation; on the other hand, the problem of the 
relationship of cultural import and local production in creating a national culture. 
An early example, witnessing this link, can be found in the invectives of the journal 
editor István Kultsár (1760-1828)7, protagonist of the campaign for a Hungarian 
national theatre in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Significantly, ‘national 
character’ became a keyword in his argument for building ‘national institutions’: 
“Only that country can be happy and great where the inhabitants possess a national 
character”. As this assertion needed to be explained in view of the multiethnic 
character of the Hungarian patria, Kultsár did not hesitate to link nationhood, 
language, and mores and also loyalty to the fatherland and the King:
The Hungarian nation in this fatherland is the first according to its right, number, and 
the cultivation of its language. Even more so, if we look at the properties of its heart. 
Benevolent, full-hearted, faithful, straightforward, brave, constant8.
In his Encouragement (Buzdítás) dating from 1815, once again in favor of setting up a 
permanent national theatre, Kultsár admonished his compatriots to cultivate these 
“national traits”, inserting his call for national self-cultivation into a stadial model of 
history – contrasting the archaic martial virtue of the ancestors to “national culture”, 
the focus of modern national character. Polishing national culture is conditioned 
by the cultivation of the vernacular language. In order to reach this aim, Kultsár 
also called for the collection and systematization of folklore: “in every nation they 
collect diligently the national songs, because from them it is easy to understand the 
culture of the time, and the character of the nation”9 and he also theorized on the 
national peculiarity of the Hungarians on the basis of their “national dances”10. It is 
not hard to identify the intellectual inspiration of these suggestions in the Austrian 
patriotic project of Joseph von Hormayr, who engaged in collecting and publishing 
the folklore traditions of the peoples living in the Monarchy11.
6 Recently, the emergence of “national literature” has been in the focus of interest of a number 
of Hungarian literary historians, who otherwise subscribe to rather divergent theoretical and 
methodological premises. See Péter Dávidházi, Egy nemzeti tudomány születése (Toldy Ferenc 
és a magyar irodalomtörténet) (Budapest: Akadémiai–Universitas, 2004); Pál S.Varga, A nemzeti 
költészet csarnokai (Budapest: Balassi, 2005); Mihály Szajbély, A nemzeti narratíva szerepe a magyar 
irodalmi kánon alakulásában Világos után (Budapest: Universitas, 2005).
7 On Kultsár’s life and works see János Markos, Kultsár István, 1760-1828 (Pannonhalma: 
Pannonhalmi füzetek, 1940).
8 In Hazai és külföldi tudósítások, 1809/2., 6; quoted by Markos, Kultsár István, 39.
9 In Hasznos mulatságok, 1817/3., 21; quoted by Markos, Kultsár István, 54.
10 See his articles in Hasznos mulatságok on “Hungarian national dance” (from 1817 and 1823).
11 István Feny�, “Ábránd a nemzet családéletér�l”, in Nemzet, nép, irodalom (Budapest: Magvet�, 
1973) especially 129ff.
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The local context of the intensification of the debate on national culture was the 
question of the reform of the national language, where the traditionalists often 
referred to the national tradition to reject the neologisms of the other camp. The 
broader scholarly context was the problem of creative genius that became a crucial 
issue of aesthetic theory in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
focusing on the figures of Homer, Ossian and Milton, who expressed the spirit of 
their ‘nation’ through epic poetry. The problem of originality, national language 
and national character thus became increasingly interrelated, which is testified 
by a large number of articles from the period, such as the Piarist Emil Buczy’s 
(1782-1839) essay in Erdélyi Muzéum (A’ görög genie kifejl�dése okának sejdítése, from 
1817) where he argued for the native tradition, and referred to the “national 
character” of the Greeks12 as a model to emulate. In the debate on originality vs. 
imitation, the historian magnate József Teleki used Herderian arguments to 
argue for the “national framework” of language reform, while the “orthologist” 
(i.e. anti-neologist) discourse of originality – which marked the most prestigious 
scholarly review of the period, Tudományos Gy�jtemény [Scientific collection] 
(its protagonists being the above-mentioned István Kultsár, the prominent art 
collector and historian Miklós Jankovich, and the university professor István 
Horvát) – drew on the Herderian conception of the “ages of nations”, constructing 
“national culture” as the normative principle of continuity while criticizing the 
“heedless” reformism based on neologism and import.
In the period between 1817 and 1822 Tudományos Gy�jtemény published a 
considerable number of articles on national culture, heritage and character. 
These texts were marked by an overall conservative tone, at the same time the 
authors sought to address the up-to-date topics of scholarly debate, which often 
challenged this conservative position. One of the core questions, inherited from 
the Enlightenment, was the relationship of environmental factors and inherent 
character traits. The very “Preface” to the first issue of the journal13, entitled “On 
national culture in general” contained a lengthy argument about the impact of 
climate on physiognomy, morality, work and character. Warm climate gave birth 
to temperamental people, characterized by inconstancy and mostly conservative 
political options. In contrast, men living under cold climate tended to be peaceful 
and tolerant, and were characterized by an aptitude to learn. Finally, moderate 
climate engendered brave peoples, whose life was marked by permanent 
change, and whose best representatives sought to control this change by moral 
constancy, a typical example of which is “Roman virtue”. The article sought 
nevertheless to relativize the climatic theory, rejecting both Hume’s skepticism 
and Montesquieu’s determinism, focusing on “civil society” (polgári társaság) 
12 Feny�, “Az eredetiség-program kialakulása és kritikai értemezése 1817-1822 között”, in 
Feny�, Nemzet, nép, irodalom, 41-115. See also Lajos Csetri’s study on Buczy: “Adalékok Döbrentei 
Erdélyi Muzéumának irodalomszemléletéhez. (Buczy Emil tanulmányairól)”, in Amathus vol. I. 
(Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2007) 161-178.
13 “A Nemzeti Culturáról közönségesen”, Tudományos Gy�jtemény (1817/1): 13-42.
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as the basis of national culture, and consequently stressing that the influence 
of governments could overwrite climatic factors and what is more climate itself 
was subject to change. In addition to climatic factors, the article also listed a 
series of geographical determinants such as living in the mountain, the valley, 
the forest, or on the plain and also meticulously catalogued other aspects shaping 
the national character such as nutrition, customs, or even garment.
At the same time, inherent factors were also considered to be important by the 
contributors of the journal. Drawing on the German Romantic understanding of 
community, the article “On Nationality” contrasted nation as an organic entity to 
people as inorganic (orgántalan) substance, i.e. shaped by external effects14. The 
organic force is the “National-Geist” present from the origins of the nation, and 
thus the national character is mainly conditioned by those forces which were 
in vigor when the nation was formed and it emerges as a normative regulatory 
principle keeping together the national community. The German Romantic 
influence is also visible in the essay “Some patriotic informative words on the 
soul and character of the Hungarians”15, which envisioned an organic pattern 
of development for the nation, rejecting the French revolutionary jumps and 
asserting that “national soul” was the key factor in securing this evolutionary 
course of development and serving as an instrument against revolutionary chaos. 
Turning to the specific Hungarian traits, the article sought to locate the original 
root of national character in the times of moving from Asia and connect it with 
the spirit of modern times. The key features identified were bravery, virtue, 
love of rulers, loyalty, moderation, and respect of law. This initial predisposition 
was further developed by the reforms of St. Stephen introducing Christian and 
monarchic elements. The corruption of the national character was due to the 
challenge to this original harmony, in the form of limiting the rights of the ruler. 
The danger to national virtue came mainly from unhealthy foreign influences and 
from the “seeming patriotism” masking particular interests, and thus leading to 
factionalism. The regeneration of the national community in this scheme was 
possible only with the help of Austria. In general, however, the Hungarian nation 
was considered to have preserved the most important constitutive traits of her 
archaic virtue, being a friend of legitimacy, rejecting the revolutionary spirit, and 
marked by a strong patriarchal element in her national life.
In contrast to this straightforward use of national characterological topoi 
as a basis of pro-Habsburg political propaganda, other authors positioned 
themselves in a more ideologically neutral way. András Thaisz (1789-1840), 
who in 1819 became the new editor of Tudományos Gy�jtemény and turned it 
into a more liberal direction in cooperation with the reshuffled advisory board 
headed by the reformist aristocrat József Teleki, questioned the scientific value 
14 “A Nemzetiségr�l”, Tudományos Gy�jtemény (1817/5): 57-61.
15 “Némelly hazafi úi emlékeztet� szavak a’ Magyarok lelke és charactere fel�l”, Tudományos Gy�jtemény 
(1822/6): 30-56.
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of general statements about national specificity. Eventually, he asserted that 
such statements about a nation’s character are only good for joking and not for 
scientific work16. He also admitted, however, that mere induction was a dubious 
tool for describing the national character as every difference generated new 
categories. In order to demonstrate the potentials of a more scientific approach, 
Thaisz referred to the standards of contemporary Staatswissenschaften, like 
Anton W. Gustermann’s Die Verfassung des Königreiches Ungarn (1811). Steeped in 
this Late Enlightenment scholarly paradigm, Thaisz referred to the problems of 
defining the nation in view of the governing elite or in view of the common 
people, and also evoked the classical eighteenth-century polemic concept of 
“private patriots”. Instead of sweeping generalizations and anecdotic details, 
he called for a synthetic study of national language, literature, geography, and 
history as a way to “map” the national character. He also rejected the idea of a 
timeless National-Geist infusing the national history from its very beginning, 
and stressed rather the ruptures, contrasting old Hungarian anarchy and violent 
behavior to modern friendliness and civility. In line with this enlightened 
vision of social and moral evolution he described “real patriotism” in terms 
of educating the nation by comparing it to the more developed nations and in 
another essay from 1820 he even contrasted self-centered “nationalism” (using 
the neologism nacionalizmus) to the more benign “patriotism”.
It is characteristic that Thaisz came from the northern-Hungarian urban elite 
with mixed Hungarian, Slovak and German ethnic and cultural background, 
representing perhaps the last generation of Hungarus intellectuals in a period 
when the process of nationalization became increasingly based on ethno-
cultural references. As a matter of fact, bringing together civic and ethno-
cultural aspects of nationhood posed a serious challenge to all the authors of the 
Hungarian Reform Age. The discussions of Hungarian ‘national character’ often 
witnessed these dilemmas of the incipient process of modern nation-building. 
While, in general, the focus of nationality was shifting from ‘customs’ towards 
‘language’, in the peculiar situation of having to forge a national community 
from a population where less than fifty percent was ethnically Hungarian, and 
where the Hungarian vernacular was far from being dominant, the conceptual 
and theoretical ambiguities quickly came to the fore.
Johannes (János) Csaplovics (1780-1847), who had mostly Slovak ancestors 
and who can thus be considered an exemplary case of ‘Hungarus-consciousness’, 
published a pioneering description of the country, Gemälde von Ungern17 in 
1829. The book, based on a previous publication from 1822 in Tudományos 
Gy�jtemény, witnesses a historical moment which was still largely untouched 
by the romantic atmosphere of ‘national revival’. It depicts Hungary in terms of 
16 András Thaisz, “Közönséges Észrevételek a’ Nemzeti Charakternek megítélésére különösen 
pedig a’ magyar Nemzetr�l hozott némelly ítéletekre”, Tudományos Gy�jtemény, (1819/9): 32-55.
17 Johannes Csaplovics, Gemälde von Ungern (Pest: Hartleben, 1829).
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a mind-boggling ethnic, cultural and geographical multiplicity (stressing that 
“Hungary is Europe in small”). Avoiding the conceptual distinction of ‘ethnie’ 
and nation, it allows for the existence of many nations in the same fatherland. 
Describing his patria, Csaplovics was at pains to reject the accusation of 
barbarism, while accepting a specific cultural otherness, accentuating for 
instance the patriarchalism of Hungarian life. He constructed this otherness in 
terms of Herderian references – admitting that the Volkscharakter of European 
nations was gradually dissolving and therefore there was a pressing need to 
study them. At the same time, he rejected Herder’s infamous prophecy about 
the Hungarians as a nation bound to extinction.
Rather than a Herderian construction of ‘national authenticity’, the basis of 
Csaplovics’ description of Hungary was the Late Enlightenment genre of Statistik 
(especially the work of Márton Schwartner, a pupil of Schlözer), meaning a 
complex science of government, mapping the human and natural resources of 
a given territory. He contrasted his project of Statistische Ethnographie to political 
history (Staatsgeschichte), pointing out the limited nature of historical works 
describing only high politics. Instead, he suggested that the physical, moral 
and socio-cultural state of the population needed to be taken into account. As 
one of the key markers defining the nation, he referred to language, but he 
immediately qualified this assertion by admitting the possibility of language 
changes. Drawing on the Enlightenment tradition of deciphering cultural 
and political diversity, he turned to the climatic model to characterize the 
inhabitants of Hungary, using the North-South divide even within the country 
to explain the specificities of the different nations.
According to Csaplovics, the character of Magyars is derived from the 
generally warm climate, generating vivid fantasy, which results in such level 
of exaltation that they often start talking to themselves. At the same time, they 
are marked by a lack of curiosity, friendliness, hospitality, and fieriness. This 
set of character-traits is then compared to the other nationalities: for instance, 
in comparison, the Slovaks tend to be somewhat less courageous, the Germans 
even less so, while the Jews are at the bottom of the list, as they “do not have any 
courage whatsoever”. Csaplovics takes into account other, less apparent, aspects 
as well, making comparative schemes of the prevalence of drinking, fighting 
or criminality in the respective communities. On the whole, his discourse of 
national character was that of the late Enlightenment. Rather than projecting 
a scheme of national revival as a reaction to the Germanization enforced by 
Enlightened Absolutism, he considers the population of Hungary as subject to 
a civilizing process which started with the benign rule of Joseph II, marked by 
reforms and general progress. Significantly, he did not have much to say about 
his own decade, which was marked by the intensification of national sentiment, 
eventually challenging his conception of supra-ethnic patriotism.
Gradually transcending the horizons of pluralistic ethnographical and 
statistical descriptions of the country, in the 1820s national specificity became 
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a key issue of intellectual discussion, formulated in an aesthetic register chiefly 
in the debate concerning imitation and/or originality of literary works. While 
the ‘popular tradition’ was in its rhetorical focus, in the 1810s the conservative 
discourse of the ‘orthologists’ did not identify the ‘national’ with the peasantry. As 
the issue of the peasantry became gradually incorporated by the liberals into the 
debate on national specificity, and thus acquired a direct socio-political relevance, 
the debate on national character had increasingly powerful repercussions in 
the entire emerging public sphere from the mid-1820s onwards. The paradox 
aspect of this development was that by activating an ethno-cultural system of 
references, the more inclusive social discourse seeking to integrate the peasantry 
also implied a more exclusivist turn towards defining Hungarianness in terms 
of linguistic and cultural homogeneity, undermining the possibility of multiple 
identification characteristic of the ‘Hungarus-mentality’.
The move towards a cultural redefinition of the nation was tentatively 
made by Ferenc Kölcsey (1790–1838), poet, literary critic, and liberal politician, 
who was also one of the main participants of the controversy over the use of 
neologisms in the Hungarian language back in the 1810s, defending the main 
ideologue of the modernists, Kazinczy, against the traditionalist camp. While 
starting as a classicist and follower of the aesthetic principles of the Late 
Enlightenment, in the late-1810s he came to formulate a project of creating a 
“national literature” inspired by romantic aesthetic ideas, though also retaining 
a plethora of elements from the Enlightenment and the classicist literary 
tradition. The transformation of Kölcsey’s poetic style and aesthetic views is 
usually taken to be the key document of the complex process of transition from 
Classicism to Romanticism. In his Letters from Lasztóc (1817), in which he drew on 
the romantic reinterpretation of Greek culture, especially by Friedrich Schlegel, 
Kölcsey formulated a program of poetic originality linking the problem of the 
organic quality of culture with the process of creation.
The most important issue of the ‘revivalist’ movement was the 
construction of a framework of cultural institutions and the creation of a 
‘national canon.’ In the romantic vision mediated by such works as Joseph 
Görres’ Mythengeschichte der Asiatischen Welt, Friedrich Schlegel’s Geschichte der 
alten und neuen Literatur and the writings of Jakob Grimm, every nation was 
encouraged to recover its mythical pre-history in order to develop its own 
peculiar (“eigentümlich”) literature and national culture. In the programmatic 
“National traditions” (1826) Kölcsey set out to identify the ‘usable’ elements 
from the Hungarian collective cultural memory and ‘national’ history, 
which might be possibly employed for building such a canon. The writers 
seeking to shape the national discourse had to come to terms with the fact 
that Hungarians evidently had no epic traditions comparable to Homer, 
the recently ‘discovered’ Ossian, or even the South-Slav epic poems which 
attracted widespread attention from the 1790s onwards. The lack of ancient 
poetry prompted poets like Mihály Vörösmarty (1800-1855) to write literary 
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epics on subjects of Hungarian prehistory, while others went so far as to try 
to fake such an epic tradition, with limited success.
As Kölcsey formulated the problem:
Nations boasting of their long past tend to reach back right to the creation of the world 
with their traditions, and they recount their stories, albeit in a fabulous form, from 
the times of their origin. Should we then conclude that a nation that is unable to do 
so is a quite recent branch of some more ancient tribe from which it separated, so 
slight in number as to be unworthy of attention, and then, growing ignorant, came 
to remember nothing about its separation? Or that a nation without tradition has 
wasted away its time in a spiritless fashion, without any great feats, and thus had no 
memories to pass on to its descendants?18.
Kölcsey’s response to this challenge was to propose a literary canon that should 
serve to educate the “national public”. Drawing on Herderian inspiration, “National 
traditions” reiterated the organic theory of national development, comparing the 
archaic peoples to children and the more civilized ones to adult persons. The young 
nations are more open to irrational impulses, and this ‘animistic’ mindset, deeply 
affected by every extraordinary event, produces the national mythologies. Successful 
national cultures, like the classical Greek one, evolved organically from these archaic 
roots, assimilating the foreign influences step by step, so that they could retain 
the essence of their own tradition. Gradually they became more rational, and their 
reaching back to a mythical past became a conscious self-reflection. Other cultures, 
however, like ancient Rome, assimilated an excess of sophisticated foreign influences 
and never managed to establish their own autonomous cultural climate.
Measured by this vision of organic development, Hungarian culture suffered 
from serious inadequacies due to the fact that the public memory has almost 
completely erased references to the heroic age:
Christianity, politics and science have brought our Hungarians closer to their 
European neighbors in diverse ways; on the other hand, their own state constitution, 
language, customs and mutual animosities have held them back in diverse ways. It 
is thus that they have adapted many European features, while at the same time they 
preserved many non-European ones. But the latter were much more conspicuous only 
fifty years ago than they are now; and the more they incline towards decay, the more 
painfully conscious we become of the absence of a writer who could have portrayed 
our ancestors in their simple and original greatness19.
This does not mean that the past glories were completely missing, as there are 
indirect proofs of the ancient virtue of Hungarians, but the historical hurricanes 
18 Ferenc Kölcsey, “Nemzeti hagyományok”. I used Dávid Oláh’s translation in Discourses of 
Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1775-1945): Texts and Commentaries, vol. II: 
National Romanticism, eds. Balázs Trencsényi and Michal Kopeček (Budapest: CEU Press, 
2007), 121.
19 Kölcsey, “Nemzeti hagyományok”, 122.
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sweeping the country in the past thousand years and the fateful rejection of the 
pre-Christian cultural heritage in the Middle Ages erased their memory. In order to 
create a replacement for the national mythology, Kölcsey revisited the Hungarian 
literary tradition, inquiring whether it could serve as a symbolic framework for the 
envisaged national awakening. In the last section of the essay, he turns to Hungarian 
literature from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, deploring the inorganic 
dominance of Latin over the vernacular, which was also linked to his counter-
position of the authenticity of Homer and Ossian to the “corruption” of Virgil.
In this construction, ‘national culture’ and ‘national character’ are not 
completely overlapping with ‘popular culture’. It is clear that Kölcsey had strong 
reservations. Speaking of the folksongs he asserted:
In some of them we encounter, even if only for a few lines, genuine sentiments, a 
certain light and carefree flight and an attractive alternation from one subject to the 
other; but it is also undeniable that their most vulgar characteristic is the empty and 
inappropriate fabrication of rhymes, which causes the most incongruous ideas to be 
strung together and to form a ridiculous disarray, in which better-matched ideas are 
occasionally intermingled20.
His aim was rather to create a national high culture while drawing on popular 
inspiration, as the repertory of the national tradition. But he was conscious 
that the irreversible progress would eventually sweep away the authentic folk 
culture – the question was whether the Hungarians could create a modern but 
national high culture, or would lose their national individuality altogether. In 
his vision, the success depended on the creation of a new national literature, an 
aesthetic sphere where national history and character could be internalized by 
the population, providing them with a framework of identification:
Happy is the poet who can allure us to such pleasant illusions, and from whose world 
no cold interests, unpleasant conflicts or feelings of strangeness can thrust our fancy 
back! In his works a real poetic realm would be created in which a refined nation 
would find its homeland; in his works the glorious heroic past and the present, the 
sentiments of humanity and patriotism could all embrace; while we, constantly held 
in check by remembrance and compulsion, would be saved from the peril posed by an 
incessant progress pressing further and further forward – the peril of gradually losing 
our original features and our bosoms becoming unable to take fire any more21.
Consequently, the idea of ‘national character’ (which he also described in terms of 
national “sentimentalism of character” – “karakteri szentimentalizmus”) fulfils two 
functions in Kölcsey’s writing: on the one hand it is a product of the past, a result of 
historical development, on the other hand it is a regulative idea, to be expressed by the 
authors who are theorizing on national culture and to be followed by poets and writers 
20 Kölcsey, “Nemzeti hagyományok”, 122.
21 Kölcsey, “Nemzeti hagyományok”, 123.
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who seek to create a national high culture. While the specification (sentimentalism) 
did not have a lasting influence, the overall impact of Kölcsey’s construction was 
remarkable. Even though this essay was permeated by an almost self-destructive 
attitude towards the national community lacking ‘national traditions’, by elaborating 
a new vision of the national functions of art, Kölcsey’s essay turned out to be the most 
important statement of cultural nation-building in Hungary, and in many ways it 
determined the ensuing discussions on the ‘national character’22.
This program of ‘originality’ became a veritable master-narrative of the Hungarian 
public sphere in the 1830s. We can find similar claims in virtually every sphere 
of figurative arts or literature, and the concept of national character came to play a 
pivotal role in these rhetoric appeals. These debates on originality can be integrated 
into the framework of the ‘regimes of historicity’ co-existing and often competing in 
Hungarian (and European) culture at the time. There are basically four representations 
of history used in the period of ‘national revival’: the Christian conception of the 
teleological movement of humanity; the secular vision of technological-intellectual 
progress popularized by the last generation of the French Enlightenment (like 
Condorcet); the accumulative progress of civility characteristic mainly of the British 
versions of the Enlightenment; and the prescriptive-historicist vision (in a way, the 
radicalization of the accumulationist discourse, criticizing – from a conservative 
perspective – the ‘polished’ culture propagated by the Scottish tradition).
There is, however, a common trait in all these traditions: they all depicted 
an immanent march of Humanity towards higher levels of existence (the 
question was rather about the pace and the direction than the very existence 
of this movement). This immanent vision of human progress posed a 
fundamental challenge to the intellectuals speculating on the destiny of 
their respective nation. If the progress of Humanity unfolded anyhow, the 
individual nations faced a pressing alternative: they either catch up with the 
pace of the march, and turn from objects into subjects of History, or, if they 
fail to fashion their particularity along the lines of universality, they have to 
disappear, melting into the moulds of more promising versions of cultural 
and political individuality. As the principal figure of the Hungarian Reform 
Age, István Széchenyi (1791-1860), puts it:
If time was not progressing, and consequently the present was not followed by a 
tomorrow, and the man of today by the future, then probably the most sober way 
would be to remain in what is old, without endangering what we presently possess by 
our hasty grasps towards the new. But the fall of times urges us, and the present day 
will be quickly thrown into the sea of the past, as the present generation will also be 
buried under a coming age23.
22 See Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, “Framing Texts as the Representation of National Character: 
From Enlightenment Universalism to Romantic Nationalism”, in Natonal Heritage, National 
Canon ed. Mihály Szegedy-Maszák (Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 2001), 107-120.
23 István Széchenyi, Hunnia (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1985), 59-60.
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The challenge of modernity is formulated in terms of a question of existence: 
the inability of catching up means the “death of the nation”, and precisely this 
danger of extinction is perceived as an ultimate source of regeneration. The 
task of the thinker speculating about the destiny of his nation is to make his 
audience conscious of this danger of existence, and furthermore, to analyze 
his community in view of its potentials of rebirth. While he was speculating 
about national character in his diary already in the 1810s24, Széchenyi’s nation-
building program was explicated most coherently in his Hunnia (1835, published 
in 1858). In his vision, the most immediate danger is the ‘division’ of the 
national community. On the cultural/political level this means the growing 
abyss between those who “were educated abroad” (the magnates) and those who 
“had grown up in Hungary” (the country gentry). Hungarian public culture thus 
contains inorganic fragments of the Western hemisphere thrown out of their 
context, mixed up with the self-centered backwardness of the local tradition. But 
this cleavage is only the sign of a deeper division: the nation does not possess 
the set of heroic/medieval/natural values any more, but it has not yet become 
a ‘civic’ community. The real danger is thus the unbridgeable division between 
past and future – being torn between nature and culture. The Hungarian nation is 
“still rough, but not strong any more, self-confident, but not powerful”. From this 
it is obvious that, in Széchenyi’s mind, the road to national recovery is through 
the process of “polishing” the manners of the community: civilization “conquers 
in due time even the most tyrannical power”, the task is to create the specifically 
Hungarian forms of civilization, otherwise social progress will effect “a deadly 
blow on our originality and peculiarity”.
While Kölcsey tentatively located the potential of revival in the canon of 
‘national literature’, Szechenyi focused on establishing a ‘national sociability’ 
which could be the basis of integrating the achievements of Western European 
civilization without decomposing the nation. Civilization spreads through 
civility, i.e. the refinement of social interaction – therefore the success of 
the reform program depends on the emergence of a Hungarian civic culture 
of sociability (hence Széchenyi’s immense efforts to found the institutional 
framework of social interaction, like the Casino or the horse races, or his 
diatribe against the Latin language). Furthermore, this perspective engenders 
another crucial conflict: since “catching up with the march of civilization” is a 
matter of pressing urgency (it is “now or never”), the question of the cohesion 
of culture becomes of vital importance.
The push for a unitary civic culture has another side as well: only the 
elimination of divisions paves the way for the service of the common good. The 
interaction of the citizens, the transparence of the public sphere (which is the 
result of a shared pattern of civic culture, a common language) was at the root of 
24 Széchenyi discusses the problem of national character in his diary note from April 1819 on 
the basis of John Chetwoode Eustace’s A Classical Tour through Italy in 1802. See Mihály Szegedy-
Maszák, “A Nemzeti hagyományok id�szer�sége”, Valóság, 42 (1999), 6, 31-43.
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the social/political agenda of the Reformist generation, i.e. the “unification of 
interests”. However, in Széchenyi’s mind, this program of ‘unitary civic culture’ 
does not entail the forceful elimination of the cultural peculiarities marking 
the non-Magyar ethnic communities of the country. “Polishing” is a long 
process, the progress of civilization does not and should not lead to immediate 
assimilation. He believed in organic change and detested the “ridiculous 
haughtiness and impossible arrogance”25 of those “who spread or believe to 
spread the Hungarian language and Hungarianness”. The meaning of human 
progress is a movement towards liberty, so those measures which indirectly lead 
to restraining liberty (like forced abandonment of customs) go fundamentally 
against the normativity of history. The need for a unitary political culture is a 
crucial exigency, but it can only be formed by communication, as a result of 
common interests and mutual gains26.
In Széchenyi’s understanding the ‘historical chance’ of the Hungarian 
nation is its peculiar tradition of constitutionalism and this potentiality of 
liberty constitutes the core of the offer towards the non-Magyar population: 
their acceptance of the Hungarian public sphere would secure the advantages 
of constitutional existence for them. This offer was to become the most crucial 
element of the whole tradition of liberal nationalism in the Reform Age: however, 
the contradictions inherent in Széchenyi’s conception would gradually surface.
On the one hand, Széchenyi did not question the right of the nationalities 
to their own cultural individuality: the three measures he proposed are the 
replacement of Latin by Hungarian as the language of the public administration, 
full liberty in the use of language and religion for the nationalities, and the 
common task of refining customs and advancing the cultural level of the country. 
He cautioned against the “exaggerated fervor” of Magyarization, and claimed 
that the national agitation among the non-Magyar communities is mainly 
the consequence of the misplaced arrogance on the Magyarizers’ part. On a 
conceptual level, he also accepted the existence of “Croat, Serbian, Romanian, 
German, etc”. nations (“the angel of nationality smiled on them as well”), thus 
the “offer” of Hunnia is not elimination but incorporation.
While Széchenyi accepted the existence of national plurality within the 
country, he proposed the extension of the Hungarian constitution to all citizens 
of the realm, which also entailed turning the public culture of the country into 
Hungarian. With the abandonment of Latin, Hungarian language would become 
the medium of interaction in the public sphere. In a sense, Hungarianness would 
retain its dual function underpinning both the ethnic and the political community. 
The institutional framework of the realm would unite the different nationalities 
without fusing their individuality: “let us unite in our public relations, one body 
25 Széchenyi, Hunnia, 50.
26 On Széchenyi’s political ideas see George Bárány, Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of 
Hungarian Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968).
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one soul, for our common country, and common ruler”27. This means a sharp 
separation of public and private spheres, without the move – so characteristic of 
the next generation of liberal nationalists – of identifying the sphere of nationality 
exclusively with the public sphere. In Széchenyi’s mind, the private sphere has 
its part in national existence as well (since nationhood itself is the product of 
civilization, while the progress of civility is a transformation characterizing our 
public and private selves alike). The Magyar character of “Hunnia” is thus a matter 
of de facto proportions of power: the Magyars hold the greatest estates, they make 
up the relatively largest community, they have a splendid past, a national fervor, 
and most importantly, “we are alone”, i.e. contrary to the other communities 
which all-have their kin-states outside of the realm of Saint Stephen, the destiny 
of the Magyars is fatally intertwined with the future of Hungarian statehood.
Széchenyi asserted that this Hungarian primacy within the realm is 
compatible with the universal norms of natural right, equity, and justice. 
This primacy does not exclusively rely on historical grounds, it is not only the 
consequence of the past (i.e. conquest) but it is based on the promises of the 
future – the invitation of the whole population of the country to constitutional 
liberties (in a way, this is the message of his assertion that “Hungary does not 
belong to the past, but to the future”). In this sense, for Széchenyi national 
tradition and civil liberties ultimately overlapped. He pointed out that 
Hungarians were backward in civilization but had a crucial asset, their ancient 
constitution, which contained the potential of recovery. This recovery was 
conditioned by self-knowledge: coming to terms with the national past and 
with the present corruption as well. In this sense, while he was mostly under 
the influence of the British stadial vision of progress, his conception can also 
be linked to the German idealist philosophies of history, where development 
was identified with the progress in self-understanding, leading through self-
negation towards a new synthesis of reaching transcendental self-awareness.
In the 1840s, the question of the grasp and pace of the nation-building 
process increasingly became a major division between the different branches 
of the Hungarian liberal camp. Perceiving the nobility to be the bearer of the 
national specificity (historically and in view of the development of civility, as 
well), Széchenyi was suspicious of the plebeian-egalitarian thrust of the new 
generation of liberal nationalists, claiming that their inconsiderate project 
might ultimately lead to the destruction of the Hungarian nation. He became 
the proponent of an organicist reformism, accusing the more radical liberal 
nationalists around Kossuth of a counter-productive push for assimilating the 
non-Magyar population. As the radical discourse of Kossuth gained popularity 
in the early-1840s, Széchenyi tried to re-conquer the conceptual framework 
of nationalism28. He identified “patriotism” with “patience, moderation, tact” 
27 Széchenyi, Hunnia, 67.
28 István Széchenyi, A’ kelet népe (Pozsony: Wigand, 1841).
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and tried to deduce his more moderate program from the very factor (i.e. the 
irreversibility of time: “the time, once gone by, cannot be resurrected. What we 
missed today, we cannot conquer tomorrow”29), which featured as the strongest 
legitimating argument of radical action. While Széchenyi subscribed to the vision 
of the unfolding potentialities of the Hungarian nation (“the people of the East”), 
gradually realizing its special Oriental character traits in the Western world, 
he asserted that neither assimilation nor the democratization of society should 
be precipitated. In contrast, his critics (such as Lajos Kossuth or József Eötvös) 
emphasized that the sweeping spirit of the age, represented by public opinion 
rather than by the individual genius of Széchenyi, demanded such reforms.
The topoi of the debate about ‘Magyarization’ are mirrored by the 
ethnographical projects of the period. Csaplovics’s above-mentioned multi-ethnic 
vision is in stark contrast to the volume Hungary and its peoples, containing a huge 
number of regional character sketches, by Imre Vahot (1820-1879; his mother 
was the niece of Lajos Kossuth) seventeen years later, in the midst of the national 
revival movement30. In the heart of Vahot’s depiction of the patria one finds the 
intertwining of language and national character to such an extent that he even 
chose to narrate the national history in terms of the march of vernacularism, 
criticizing the “mistaken policies of kings” in the Middle Ages for the neglect of 
the Hungarian mother tongue. The book was also heavily loaded with references 
to the political and cultural superiority of the Hungarians over the other 
nationalities of the country, stressing the dominance of Hungarians both in the 
nobility and the peasantry. At the same time, Vahot’s depiction of Hungarian 
character-traits, taken from Elek Fényes’s contemporary work of statistical 
description, does not differ radically from Csaplovics’s vision: most of all, the 
Hungarians are haughty, self-centered, serious, sincere, magnanimous, energetic, 
friendly, heroic, bragging, conceited, hospitable, and not very economic-minded. 
There is, however, an important new element: while Csaplovics described the 
Hungarians, as well as the other nations of the common patria, as being in need 
of civilization, Vahot fuses the stadial theory of civility adapted to the Hungarian 
context by Széchenyi (whom he describes as the “teacher of national character”) 
with the praise of rural pre-modernity, describing the Hungarians as close to 
nature. Here, once again, the quest for national specificity overlaps with the 
intention to establish the Hungarians’ primacy among the other nationalities, 
stressing that even the pre-modern aspects of their life singles them out as natural 
leaders of the country. The Hungarians’ pastoral occupations are “fitting the free 
man”, while the other nationalities are characterized by “pure naturalism”, not 
having modern character-traits (the Romanians, for instance, are described as 
29 Gróf Széchenyi István írói és hírlapi vitája Kossuth Lajossal, ed. Gyula Viszota (Budapest: Magyar 
Történeti Társulat, 1927), 51.
30 Imre Vahot, Magyarföld és népei (Budapest: ÁKV, 1984), reprint of the edition of 1846 (Pest: 
Biemel, 1846).
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“benevolent”, “smart”, but also “lazy”, “superstitious, and “base”), thus it is clear 
that they are objects rather than subjects of the nation-building process.
The disintegration of the multi-ethnic Hungarus discourse can be seen 
from Vahot’s polysemic use of the notion “Hungarian”. When he states that 
the “Hungarians, except for the Jews, are Christians” he obviously referred to 
the citizens of Hungary; at the same time, in another context, Hungarians are 
identified only with the speakers of Hungarian language. The nation-building 
project of the 1840s was eventually trying to reintegrate the two aspects, 
describing the nationalities as materials for nation-building. It is along these 
lines that Vahot was excessively praiseful of the Magyarization of Upper-
Hungarian cities, rejecting the “Slavic dream” about a “universal empire” and 
pointing out that they are gradually assimilating to the Hungarians in linguistic 
terms as well. The drive of assimilation is somewhat qualified in the case of the 
emancipation of Jews – while he praises the “enlightened spirit” of “progressive 
Hungarians” for promoting the emancipation, he also formulates some 
reservations, warning his compatriots not to haste, until the Hungarian society 
becomes economically stronger, as the “Jews are like leeches”.
A more sophisticated version of theorizing Hungarianness in the Reform Age 
was offered by Jácint Rónay (1814-1889) in his work Jellemisme (Characterology) 
which can be considered the first attempt at devising a socio-psychological 
typology of the Hungarians31. The author, a Benedictine teacher from Gy�r, had 
a remarkable itinerary: he studied psychology, participated in the revolution of 
1848-1849, emigrated, became one of the first Hungarian followers of Darwin, 
and after 1867 served as the tutor of Crown-Prince Rudolf. Characteristically for 
the mid-nineteenth century European trends, Rónay was wavering between an 
analytic and a normative definition of character – at some point he was even 
claiming that only “virtuous men have character”. Furthermore, it is important 
to stress that ‘national’ character was just one of the directions of his inquiries – 
in the second part of the book, he also added a characterology of gender. Similar 
to most of the eighteenth-century theories of human psyche, Rónay derived 
the main factors of human character from climatic and social determination. 
He made reference to Polybius and Montesquieu, claiming that moderate 
temperature is the best, but he was also stressing that climate was not the only 
factor. In line with his historical definition, he asserted that the formation of a 
national tradition was linked to natural conditions (such as food, drink, external 
threats, etc.), while the key to nationality was national language. Consequently, he 
suggested that especially phonetics, which connected the physical and spiritual 
aspects, had to be studied thoroughly in order to map the national character.
As for the methodological aspects of studying characters, Rónay suggested 
that different individuals had different traits, so characterizing a community 
31 Jácint Rónay, “Jellemisme” (originally published in 1847) in Nemzetkarakterológiák, ed. György 
Hunyady (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), 51-224.
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could only be a generalization. In line with his democratic political agenda, 
he suggested that the typical national character-traits could be found in the 
“common people” and the “middle-class” and not in the aristocracy, which was 
exposed to ethnic and cultural intermingling. His understanding of character 
was overwhelmingly historical: as he claimed, the main gain of analyzing 
character was that it helped us infer the present from the past and the future 
from the present32. He thus inserted his characterological discourse into an 
evolutionary vision: as humankind is exposed to progress, national character is 
also necessarily exposed to change. Every nation has “ages” – in its childhood it 
is in need of education, marked by the flow of imagination and consequently 
a poetic culture, thus the expression of its character can be found in songs, 
music, poetry. The second phase is that of adolescence, marked by passions, 
characterized by a gradually emerging sense of collectivity. Rónay qualified this 
statement with the claim that not every people could reach this level, i.e. progress 
was only a possibility but not a necessity. Characteristically, he did not extend his 
simile of human ages to describe decline in terms of old age and kept to the logic 
of the evolutionary theory envisioning permanent progress.
In order to construct the characterology of Hungarians, Rónay went 
back to the description of the Byzantine emperor Leo the Wise (r. 886-912), 
whose observations on the mores of ancient Hungarians were among the 
first to survive. Quoting Leo, Rónay stressed the trait of bravery and military 
discipline. It is important to note that this source was to make a long career in 
the tradition of Hungarian national characterology, becoming a key reference 
in Gyula Szekf�’s “What is the Hungarian?” project in the late-1930s. Rónay 
pointed out the existence of certain oriental traits still present in the Hungarian 
folk character – attested by their folksongs and their organization of space. 
Rejecting Schlözer’s accusation of barbarism, he stressed that this archaism was 
extremely important in view of the survival of the nation. However, modern 
Hungarians were exposed to the danger of heedless imitation, which could lead 
to the elimination of national character. Here the normative aspect of Rónay’s 
definition of character becomes important: losing the national character 
implies not only transformation, but loss of morality altogether, and eventually 
the dissolution of the nation. One of the main aspects of this danger was the 
abandonment of national language – here Rónay addressed his criticism 
especially to the nobility. At the same time, he did not reject cultural import 
altogether: accepting the precondition of belatedness of Hungary in comparison 
with the West33, he asserted the need for imitation, stressing that every culture 
at the beginning of its progress is based on imitating the more advanced ones.
Echoing Széchenyi’s analysis, Rónay described the specific situation of the 
Hungarians as being in an abyss, torn between heroic past and future progress. 
32 Rónay, “Jellemisme”, in Nemzetkarakterológiák, ed. Hunyady 51. 
33 Rónay, “Jellemisme”, in Nemzetkarakterológiák, ed. Hunyady, 119-120.
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The present-day Hungarians are characterized by the lack of self-knowledge, 
busy importing foreign goods and ideas, but also marked by a profound distrust 
of foreigners, cultivating the memory of their heroic past while plunging 
into permanent internal strife. Following Széchenyi’s program of national 
introspection, the task of the reformers is to register the continuity between 
the features of the ancient Hungarians and the envisioned modern institutions, 
thus converting the archaic virtues into modern civilizing values. National past 
should be a source of pride – but the new Hungary to be built must integrate 
the achievements of modernity. Rónay insisted on the Hungarians being a 
new nation, who had not yet reached fully-fledged nationhood. He remained 
nevertheless optimistic, considering the “national revival” of the 1830-1840s 
as a success story, a sign of reaching adolescence. The aim of this revival in 
his reading was creating a new society where the bourgeoisie could play the 
key role. He was not worried of the ethnic otherness of the Hungarian urban 
class: he considered them aliens but possible to assimilate. In contrast, with 
all his sympathies, he did not consider the peasantry as the normative basis of 
the new nation-building: he stressed repeatedly that they were still marked by 
“oriental” authoritarianism. At the same time, the integration of the peasantry 
into the national community was supported by ‘characterological’ arguments 
as well: Rónay was busy pointing out the fragments of constitutional existence 
in the rural world – going so far as to describe the outlaws of the Bakony hills 
as ardent followers of a code of honor, which allegedly attested the ancient 
constitutionalism of the Hungarians.
On a different conceptual level, the same debate on the perspectives 
of nation-building gave birth to the first attempts to create a ‘national 
philosophy’, i.e. a philosophical system rooted in the Hungarian national 
character34. This project came to tackle the same issues that we can find in the 
works of Széchenyi, such as the intertwining of the idea of civic nation with 
the discussion of the ethno-cultural heritage, a projection of a normative 
past and the topos of belatedness, references to the Volksgeist/national spirit 
and the assertion of a universalistic aspiration. The general trend of these 
philosophical experiments was to define Hungarian spirit as being situated 
in-between the available options – hence the keyword of “Hungarian 
harmonistics”, implying a new synthesis between the various Western 
high cultures, not rejecting the import of ideas but deriving originality 
from the unique combination of these elements. The complex interplay of 
the universalistic drive of philosophy and the aim to nationalize it is the 
most important message of the works of the ex-officer and political thinker, 
Gusztáv Szontagh (1793-1858), who was the first one to be elected to the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences in his capacity of a philosopher. His Propylaea 
34 The recurrent theme of “national philosophy” in Hungarian philosophical thought has 
been recently studied by László Perecz, see his Nemzet, filozófia, “nemzeti filozófia” (Budapest: 
Argumentum, 2008).
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to Hungarian philosophy35 aimed at establishing a Hungarian philosophical 
tradition, bringing together the progress of national philosophy with 
the phases of the development of Hungarian nationhood. Szontagh was 
especially fascinated by Scottish philosophy, which he praised also on account 
of its practical orientation and for being the creation of a small nation. The 
Hungarian predicament was necessarily imitation and compilation, but the 
final aim was to devise a national philosophy, albeit not in view of its object, 
but its spirit and presentation. In Szontagh’s understanding, the main mental 
trait of the Hungarians, namely being characterized by a balanced disposition 
between sentiment and reason, also facilitated the creation of a philosophical 
system balancing between the different Western traditions. In a sense, one 
can read all his speculations on national philosophy as a counter-project to 
the most obvious trajectory of the one-sided cultural reliance on German 
sources, mainly Hegelianism.
The political context of his second major work, Propylaea to social philosophy 
with regard to the situation of our country36 was the debate around Széchenyi’s essay 
Kelet népe (The people of the East). One of the central notions of the debate was 
progress37, as the main issue of controversy was the ‘meaning’ of Hungarian 
historical destiny in view of the clash of the more evolutionary and radical 
visions of modernization and nation-building. Entering the debate, Szontagh 
also turned to the problem of philosophy of history38. In order to establish the 
historical mission of a nation, the most important aspect to consider was its 
culture. Along these lines, Szontagh stressed that history of culture was superior 
to political history, while the irradiation of national spirit could be best analyzed 
with regard to national literature. National progress was following the ages of 
the individual. However, cultural creativity could somehow transcend the actual 
level of civilization: cultivated individuals could exist even in uncultivated 
communities, forming part of the intelligentsia of the nation, and thus 
representing the humankind of a coming era. In contrast, the common people 
in an uncultivated society are usually sticking to old mores and customs, ruled 
by authority. Szontagh contrasted this to the life-style of the citizen, the grown-
up member of the nation, who assumes responsibility for his own deeds. The 
emergence of citizenship is rooted in progress: but Szontagh did not fail to 
point out that progress presupposed peaceful development, not revolution. 
Progress was not so much political rather civilizatory: the heralds of progress 
35 Gusztáv Szontagh, Propylaeumok a’ magyar philosophiához (Buda: Magyar Királyi Egyetem, 1839).
36 Gusztáv Szontagh, Propylaeumok a társasági philosophiához tekintettel hazánk viszonyaira (Buda: 
Eggenberger, 1843).
37 János Varga – in his A Hungarian Quo Vadis. Political Trends and Theories of the Early 1840s 
(Budapest: Akadémiai, 1993) – characterizes the entire political discourse of the Reform Age as 
an attempt at bringing progress and the national imperative together.
38 Szontagh, Propylaeumok a társasági philosophiához tekintettel hazánk viszonyaira, 24ff
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in a rustic age were the cultivated nations, while in uncultivated nations the 
cultivated individuals. This evolutionary vision, which might well be considered 
a secularized eschatology, was a precondition of social and political action: one 
needs to believe that there is a generic progress towards perfection39, since 
rejecting this vision makes self-sacrifice meaningless.
 From this modernist-evolutionist perspective, his final word in the debate 
on the speed and direction of national progress was conciliatory: progress is 
unavoidable, “difference and debate is only about how and in what way, and 
especially over quicker or slower progress”40. Faithful to his moderate stance and 
belief in self-regulating processes of civilization, Szontagh opted for a middle 
way, balancing between preserving the privileges and the revolutionary system, 
and stressed the need of organic reforms.
The Revolution of 1848 and the ensuing War of Independence meant a turn 
in the discourse of nationhood as well. If before 1848 the questions of nation-
building and the nationalities were mostly of theoretical nature, the conflicts 
and the ensuing civil war made the Hungarian political elite painfully aware of 
the importance of the nationality question. After the fall of banners, some of the 
profoundest minds of the generation (like Zsigmond Kemény and József Eötvös) 
started the reconsideration of the events, agreeing that a crucial error of the 
revolutionary leadership was the insufficient handling of the nationality problem.
The Transylvanian aristocrat and writer Zsigmond Kemény (1814-1875) was a 
supporter of the liberal movement in the 1840s, developing a reformist program 
converging with that of the ‘Centralists’ around József Eötvös, who believed in 
setting up a strong executive to overcome the “feudal” power structures of the 
county administration, thus offering an alternative to Kossuth’s project who 
considered these bodies as the last bastions of self-government and a potential 
basis of democratization. Though Kemény served the revolutionary government 
until the very end, he grew increasingly disenchanted as the revolution radicalized, 
blaming Kossuth for abandoning the more organic style of reform and for 
subordinating the common good to his personal dictatorial aspirations. After the 
collapse of the revolution Kemény’s was among the first critical voices to be heard 
in the midst of collective trauma and Austrian reprisals. Kemény positioned 
himself in a very precarious way. While he harshly criticized the revolutionary 
leadership, he also opposed the aristocratic ‘old-conservative’ political platform, 
which tried to resume politics as if the Revolution of 1848 had not taken place. 
Against both directions, Kemény sought to defend the liberal reforms and 
considered the formation of a modern ‘bourgeois society’ crucial for the survival 
of the nation. He maintained some hope of the modernizing potential of the ‘neo-
absolutist’ government of Vienna, which was partially drawn from politicians (for 
example, Alexander Bach) who had a liberal political past.
39 Szontagh, Propylaeumok a társasági philosophiához tekintettel hazánk viszonyaira, 36.
40 Szontagh Propylaeumok a társasági philosophiához tekintettel hazánk viszonyaira, 72.
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Along these lines, Kemény’s political essays as well as his historical novels, 
written in the 1850s, were meant to actively ‘shape the public’ and reconsider 
the basic tenets of the Hungarian national discourse, using a normative vision 
of ‘Hungarianness’ as one of the main topoi of his argumentation. The pamphlets 
After the revolution (1850) and One more word after the revolution (1851) are 
usually considered the most characteristic representations of the conservative 
possibilities of Hungarian ‘political romanticism.’ With a sweeping rhetoric 
of collective self-criticism, Kemény called the nation to repentance after the 
“excesses” of the revolution and envisioned a model of cooperation with the 
Viennese administration which would allow Hungarian society to recover what 
it had lost during the upheavals.
Evoking Hungarian national character and the discourse of ‘national self-
knowledge’ is one of the key aspects of Kemény’s argument in After the revolution41. 
Showing how the nation faces the threat of disappearance, he calls on all political 
camps of the country to exercise self-restraint and at the same time to come to 
terms with the realities of defeat. Turning rhetorically to the Austrian authorities, 
he asserts that relaxation of military controls would not lead to a new revolt, as 
the character of the Hungarians does not contain any propensity for waging 
guerrilla warfare after a lost struggle. Turning to his compatriots, he warned 
them against “day-dreaming”, that is, hoping to resume the revolutionary fight. 
Furthermore, he argues that national regeneration should be based on collective 
remembrance and the reconsideration of the national past. While the aims of the 
author might have been conditioned more by the need of finding a modus vivendi 
with the Habsburg administration, the essay turned out to be a paradigmatic 
text of cultural and political self-positioning. It had an enormous impact and 
inspired many later works, among them Gyula Szekf�’s The three generations and 
László Németh’s essays in the interwar period.
Besides Kemény’s paradigmatic pamphlets, in the context of the traumatic 
experience of the lost fight, a number of other projects came to the fore, often 
using references to the national character as veiled political allusions. One can 
observe this in the essay by the Transylvanian philosopher and ethnographer, 
János Erdélyi (1814-1868), entitled The present (1851). Referring to the recent 
traumatic events, Erdélyi asserted that in the past lost battles had positive 
impact on the nation, implying that the lessons drawn from the defeat of the 
revolutionary struggle might also be turned to the benefit of the nation42. 
Similar to Kemény, Erdélyi sought to reconsider the national discourse in view 
of the new situation. He stressed that the main treasure of Hungarians was 
their nationality. This did not imply motionlessness but entailed permanent 
adaptation to the external conditions. When describing Hungarian popular 
41 Zsigmond Kemény, “A forradalom után” (1850), in Változatok a történelemre (Budapest: 
Szépirodalmi, 1982), 185-373.
42 János Erdélyi, “A jelen” (1851), in Válogatott m�vei (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1986), 719-749.
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character, he stressed the democratic aspects, obviously passing a – not even 
too much veiled – political message.
Not surprisingly, the problem of nationalities, as he put it, “the existence 
of many different peoples in Árpád’s homeland”, was at the core of Erdélyi’s 
inquiries as well. His concept of nation carried the same ambiguity as that of 
the Reform Age. On the one hand he declared that the basis of nationality is 
language, going as far as theorizing the national peculiarity of different nations 
on the basis of their greetings – presuming that the way different nations say 
“how do you do?” expresses their national soul. This linguistic understanding of 
nationhood prompted him to define national literature as the core of nationality, 
thus resuming the discourse of Kölcsey, stating that literature – the presence of 
the past and of the future – raises nationality to the spiritual sphere. At the same 
time, Erdélyi was tried to separate his concept of nationhood from an ethnic 
understanding, stressing that although nationality was based on the belief of 
common blood, but it was legitimized by tradition and history.
Erdélyi’s essay on the Present state of philosophy in our country from 185643 was an 
attempt at finding a conceptual balance between the imperatives of the specific 
national community and universalism, in a critical dialogue with the writings on 
‘national philosophy’ from the Reform Age, especially those by Szontagh. Erdélyi 
stressed that the principle of nationality was getting gradually weaker in poetry, 
religion and philosophy, as the highest level of human activity is by default also 
the least national. At the same time the archaic culture of the people is the basis 
of any further progress, that is why the question of national philosophy is not 
completely irrelevant.
On a conceptual level, this essay also reflected the dialogue between the 
Hungarian tradition of political nationhood and the imperative of reshaping 
the national discourse in view of an ethno-cultural tradition. In Erdélyi’s vision, 
nation was constituted by land, climate, history, state-forms and age-old customs. 
All these factors contributed to the formation of a specific character by which 
individuals could define themselves. While this list contained both natural and 
historical aspects, Erdélyi opted for a historicist understanding of nationality. 
His reference to national character was a way to define the nation historically, 
in obvious polemic with the ethno-cultural understanding professed by the 
Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, etc. national movements in the country, challenging 
the Hungarian nation-building project. Eventually nation is defined by tradition 
and the principal constitutive factor is not ethnic provenience but “national 
consciousness”.
The aim of philosophical reflection in Erdélyi’s understanding was bringing 
national specificity to the level of the universal: polishing, but preserving what is 
specific. Hungarian character thus had its own historicity and basic essentiality 
– continuing some of the archaic traits but also shaped by European interaction. 
43 Erdélyi, “A hazai bölcsészet jelene” (1856), in Válogatott m�vei, 775-825.
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The past is a regulative idea where the individual and the community can 
constantly return – “if the nation does not feel its past, it loses its present”. 
Criticizing “civil history” (i.e. political history) for failing to show the basic traits 
of national soul, he formulated the program of collecting folk-songs, proverbs 
etc. in order to facilitate this process of self-reflection, which made him the most 
important Hungarian folklorist of the nineteenth century. While national past 
is a major element of collective identity-formation, as the “self-knowing spirit” 
turns to the past, Erdélyi rejected Szontagh’s position about the nationalization 
of philosophy and stressed that the structures of human thinking are universal. 
There is no place for a national school of thinking – as the solar system is not 
Polish just because Copernicus was the first one to discover it.
Representing another direction of reshaping the national discourse, the 
works of József Eötvös in the 1850s sought to redirect the Hungarian national 
project after the trauma of the lost revolution. Most importantly, he stressed 
that the Imperial and the Hungarian levels were inseparably intertwined. He 
sought to harmonize the principles of nationality and liberty on a theoretical 
level as well: in his opinion “historical nationhood” needed to be preserved 
but, at the same time, he wanted to give concessions to the nationalities living 
in the country, which were not “historical nations” in his understanding but 
had some sort of cultural individuality. Eötvös argued for an establishment 
based on the liberal principles of individual freedom. He stressed the analogy 
of nationality with denominational identity, and claimed to propose a solution 
which could secure the liberties, not of the corporate groups (which might be 
extremely oppressive of their members), but of every particular member of the 
community.
This proposal, elaborated by Eötvös in the context of the negotiations 
with the leadership of the non-Magyar national movements, especially the 
Serbians and Romanians, was probably the intellectually most sophisticated 
conception of resolving the nationality question in Hungary to be formulated 
in the entire nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there were some problems 
with this proposal – not so much with what he actually said, rather with 
what he was silent about. It was vital for him to avoid the debate about the 
existence of more than one nation in Hungary. He thought that this ideological 
question is only the surface, and the real issue lay deeper. The reason for 
his repudiation of thinking in terms of the plurality of nations in the same 
framework was obviously his strong commitment to the mainstream national 
liberal conception asserting that nationhood is ultimately identical with the 
aspiration to statehood. Had he accepted the existence of nations within the 
realm, he would have had to accept the potential collapse of the Hungarian 
state. Instead, he sought to define the Hungarian nation in purely political 
terms, thus separating Hungarianness from the ethno-cultural aspects. As the 
subsequent development of the debate on nationalities has shown, this fragile 
compromise proposed by Eötvös could only be maintained if both of the sides 
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were willing to leave this ‘ultimate’ ideological question unpronounced. When 
the issue of ‘political’ nationhood came back to fore in 1867 the chances of 
maintaining this potential compromise vanished immediately.
There was, however, yet another option inherent in the liberal discourse, 
which was perhaps theoretically less sophisticated, but which sought to solve the 
problem of nationhood in a more realistic way by accepting the ‘nationhood’ of 
the non-Magyar population as well. Its most important proponent, Lajos Mocsáry 
(1826-1916) started from a strongly Romantic perspective and represented the 
gradually diminishing tolerant version of the Romantic liberal nationalism 
related to the anti-Compromise tradition in the Hungarian political culture. 
Arguably, Mocsáry’s belief in the peaceful co-existence of different nations in the 
same political framework might have been connected to the fact that he ‘missed’ 
the entire revolutionary period in Hungary (curing his illness in Germany) and 
thus he was probably more capable of distancing himself from the darker aspects 
of nationalism than most of his contemporaries.
Significantly, in his early writings, he entered into a fierce debate with Eötvös. 
Most of all, Mocsáry attacked Eötvös for misrepresenting the nature of national 
sentiment, arguing that it was a profound mistake to perceive nationalism as a 
craving for domination. Contrary to the mainstream liberal vision of the mid-
century, shared by Eötvös as well, the post-Herderian conception of nationhood 
professed by Mocsáry was not state-centric and although it championed a fervent 
nationalist creed (asserting that nationality was the supreme normative focus 
– something Eötvös emphatically rejected), this nationalism was built on the 
conviction that peace and prosperous co-existence was not only compatible with, 
but in fact made up the core of sincere nationalism. Nation is the community of 
people who are of the same origins, who speak the same language, who consider 
themselves to be of the same kin. Therefore in the territory of Hungary Mocsáry 
accepted the existence of more than one nation and he explicitly spoke about 
Slovak, Serb, Croat and Romanian “nations”44.
Rather than an aspiration to domination, nationality implied a universalistic 
creed: “every part has to aim at the fulfillment of the common mission of 
mankind in its own way”. It was from a ‘culturalist’ perspective that Mocsáry 
claimed that “Nation” and “Country” should converge, as the mixing of different 
populations tended to be a source of weakness (he cited the decline of the Greco-
Roman civilization as an illustration of this argument). In the case of mixed 
populations, one of the national communities has to emerge as the natural 
leader of the country, but this cannot mean a push for assimilation, since forced 
assimilation is deeply immoral, taking the most important human property 
(cultural heritage) from the citizens45.
44 Lajos Mocsáry, Nemzetiség (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1987), 42. Originally 
published in 1858.
45 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 55.
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Furthermore, Mocsáry placed an “even more generous” and more altruistic 
state of mind over nationalism, that of patriotism – an allegiance not only to 
our own national-cultural community, but to the country in general (involving 
different national groups). Mocsáry argued for the development and institutional 
advancement of this kind of patriotism, and he tried to formulate his political 
proposals in the 1850s from this perspective. The “country” should be neutral, “it 
should not become the partisan of any of the nations”46. According to Mocsáry 
the real problem was that, during the preceding decades, national feeling was 
over-emphasized to the detriment of this patriotic state of mind. But these two 
allegiances are not contradictory (he blamed Eötvös for counter-posing too 
strongly these two attitudes) at all: in the Hungarian case it is obvious that the 
national and patriotic interests converge, but Mocsáry goes further and tries to 
prove that even in the case of the other nations living in Hungary their national 
loyalty could be harmonized with Hungarian patriotism.
History makes a patria out of Hungary for more than only one nation, creating 
a community that becomes the real basis of coexistence: “the Slavs of our country 
are closer to us than any of our philologically established linguistic relatives”. In 
this list of ‘centripetal’ factors, Mocsáry recapitulates one of the crucial elements 
of the Reform Age discourse, i.e. claiming that the only country which provided 
“constitutional existence” to the Slavs was in fact Hungary. It is a thousand years 
that they have been inhabiting and possessing this land together, tilled its soil 
together and shared each other’s sufferings and joys:
Is it possible to show a single feat that can be said to have been achieved by Hungarians 
or by Slavs alone; hasn’t everything been done by joint efforts? The troops that fought 
so valiantly against the Turks, the Tartars and so many other adversaries have always 
included Hungarians, Slovaks, Croatians, Serbs, Germans and Romanians as well, and 
many a Hungarian warlord has led Slavic troops to glory, just as Croatian and Serb 
commanders have achieved similar victories with Hungarian troops. And haven’t they 
all served a common cause, with a common glory and lesser or greater success, and 
haven’t they all regarded each other as brave sons of the same homeland, as valiant 
champions of the same cause?47
While the liberal nationalists of the 1840s were offering constitutionalism in 
exchange for assimilation, Mocsáry turns the constitutionalist tradition into a 
guarantee of the preservation of Slavic national existence. In this argument the 
concept of national character becomes a symbolic framework, constituted by 
history, over-writing ethnic differences:
But in more recent times, when the struggles for liberty are no longer about abstruse 
denominational questions but more practical issues, where have the Slavs tasted the 
46 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 65.
47 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 126. I used Dávid Oláh’s translation in Trencsényi and Kopeček, eds., 
Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe, vol. II, 357.
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sweet, albeit sometimes deceptive fruits of the spirit of freedom and reform other than 
in Hungary? The other Slavs as yet knew nothing at all about these concepts when they 
were already becoming the subject of public reflection and public debates here, with an 
elevating and ennobling effect on their character that is still discernible now that the 
questions themselves have long been swept aside from the forum of debate. Only here 
did the Slavs have an opportunity for this more elevated, nobler spiritual preoccupation. 48
Even though Mocsáry had a predilection for a more culture-centric understanding 
of nationhood, eventually the historical basis of collective identity is reintroduced 
into his scheme through the re-conceptualization of patriotism (“the shared 
history of our homeland”) in contrast to the ethno-linguistic arguments:
Let scholars and linguists put us into separate columns, let them classify us into 
separate language families and say that our real kinsmen are wandering somewhere 
on the plateaux of Asia and shivering around the Arctic Sea, and that the Turks with 
whom we lived in such a pleasant fraternal harmony for centuries are in fact our dear 
kinsmen: we shall still reckon our Slavic compatriots to be more closely related to 
us. Even though we are classed as a separate group of people linguistically, we shall 
still hold dearer this long-standing proximity, friendship, compaternity and the 
intertwined branches of quasi-kinship than that other distant kinship that goes back 
to Adam and Eve49.
In this sense, while Mocsáry’s agenda was markedly different from the historicist 
nationalism supporting the unitary Hungarian political nation against the 
ethno-cultural discourse of the nationalities, he willy-nilly reverted to history 
as the main factor of defining the national community. Historical memory is 
the principal marker of national character, over-writing the ethno-cultural 
ingredients, which means that his symbolic acceptance of national plurality 
within a multi-national patria is implicitly relativized, although his position was 
still far from that of the assimilatory nationalists:
It is unthinkable that our Slavic relatives could ever forget all these historical 
memories and extinguish from their bosom the sentiments that they evoke. And as 
soon as they take a historical point of view, they are ours. Yet without history there is 
no nationality; without it there may be an enthusiastic zeal for a language, there may 
be a temporary sense of irritation towards one or other race, but this is no genuine 
national sentiment but just an artificial movement labeled with some name, which 
can never be permanent and enduring50.
On the whole, although Mocsáry exchanged a number of symbolic gestures 
especially with the Romanian national movement51, his attempts to harmonize 
48 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 131, in Discourses of Collective Identity, 360.
49 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 127-128, in Discourses of Collective Identity, 358.
50 Mocsáry, Nemzetiség, 128, in Discourses of Collective Identity, 358.
51 In 1888 Mocsáry, who by then abandoned the Independence Party, was elected in Caranșebeș 
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some sort of historical patriotism and ethno-cultural plurality turned out 
to be gradually marginalized. Eventually his ideas became rejected both by 
the mainstream of the Magyar political elite and the national movements of 
Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs and Ruthenians. This marginalization was mostly 
due to the reconfiguration of the national discourse on both “sides”. On 
the part of the titular nation, the 1860s, and especially the period after the 
Compromise of 1867, brought a new development, namely the ‘canonization’ 
of Hungarian national identity based on the fusion of political and ethno-
cultural factors. On the part of the elites of the other nationalities the liberal 
ideological framework became less and less attractive as a basis of finding a 
mutually acceptable solution and the emerging new ‘national intelligentsias’ 
were shifting to a more uncompromising position creating their own mixture 
of ethno-culturalist and historical arguments, which questioned the possibility 
of any supra-ethnic arrangement.
The fusion of historical and ethno-cultural aspects had both inclusive and 
exclusive implications. In the essay by the Transylvanian historian, Károly 
Szabó (1824-1890), On Hungarian national pride (1865), written at the end of the 
period of ‘passive resistance’ and in the context of the anticipation of some sort 
of consolidation, the core of Hungarian national character is defined in terms of 
its unique capability of resistance to external catastrophes52. Szabó stressed that 
this trait is “common to all members of the nation”, “from the aristocrat down 
to the apprentice”. Nationhood is defined is ethno-linguistic terms: as Szabó 
points out, language is “the root of national pride” attested also by such notions 
as ‘magyaráz’ (‘to explain’ – coming from the Magyar ethnonym). This stress 
on the language does not lead to a conflicting vision of ethnic otherness. In 
Szabó’s opinion, eventually going back to the Herderian vision, the existence of 
Hungarian spirit, “ingrained in the child’s mind” does not hinder the harmonic 
co-existence with others: self-esteem and esteem of others are mutually 
conditioning each other. Reflecting the Transylvanian background of the author, 
which was a region marked by centuries-old traditions of religious tolerance 
but also of a violent clash of national movements in 1848-49, his example of 
peaceful co-existence are the Transylvanian Saxons, who had been able to retain 
their own constitutional structure and cultural individuality within a political 
system dominated by the Hungarians.
This characterological sketch sought to underpin a project of ‘national 
revival’, resuming the political aims of the Reform Age of the 1830-1840s as it 
were, in the new context of the relaxation of pressure coming from Vienna. 
Subscribing to the interpretation elaborated by the most prominent liberal 
(Karánsebes), a preponderantly Romanian electoral district in the Banat. In 1892, however, he 
withdrew from parliamentary politics.
52 Károly Szabó, “A magyar nemzeti büszkeségr�l” (1865), in Kisebb történeti munkái (Budapest: 
Ráth Mór, 1873), vol. I, 285-298.
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historian of the Reform Age, Mihály Horváth, Szabó contrasted the revival of the 
1830s to the previous epoch of national alienation marked by “conservativism” 
and “laziness”, lack of vernacular culture (Latinism), and retreat from public 
affairs. The growth of national consciousness, and the concomitant progress of 
civilization were based on the revived image of national past. This means the 
organic connection between modernity and antiquity: the nation has to learn 
history to cultivate its pride and thus to attain new heights of self-realization. 
This ‘normative past’ is fusing ethnically and historically constituted aspects: 
Szabó thus links language, ancient customs, laws and national costume 
as fundamental markers of nationality. Typical for the liberal nationalist 
generation of the mid-nineteenth century, however, this cultivation of national 
tradition is not defined in an exclusivist manner, as the author also stressed the 
need “to learn what is useful” from other nations.
The linking of civilization and national traditions prepared the road for the 
symbolic and conceptual conflation of the Hungarian ethno-cultural identity 
with the state ideology, in the context of the increasingly obvious failure in 
integrating the bulk of the nationalities. The experience of national division 
became rationalized in view of a discourse of civilizational supremacy fashionable 
worldwide in these decades of liberal imperialism, albeit in this case the subject 
of this mission civilisatrice became the internal other.
The most grandiose scheme of Hungarian liberal imperialism was devised by 
the historian and diplomat, Béni Kállay (1839-1903). He was also the mastermind 
of Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the occupation 
in 1878, serving as its governor between 1882 and 1903. Beyond his political 
involvement, Kállay authored a history of Serbia, and in his youth also translated 
J. S. Mill’s On Liberty, publishing it with a theoretical preface that is among the 
most sophisticated theoretical statements of Hungarian liberalism in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Kállay’s programmatic essay, Hungary on the border 
of East and West53 published after he assumed his task in Sarajevo, might be read 
as the synthesis of the underlying assumptions of the Hungarian ‘geopolitical’ 
project in Southeast Europe, devising a sweeping symbolic geographical tableau 
and also reassessing the previous tradition of ‘national philosophy’, defining the 
national mission in terms of a spiritual synthesis.
Kállay based his argument on a geographical narrative contrasting the 
“Orient” and the “Occident”, describing the Baltic Sea, the Carpathians, the 
Lower Danube, and the Adriatic Sea as the borderline between these two worlds, 
although stressing the permanent interplay of the two zones and defining the 
European East and the Levant as some sort of buffer zone. The principal feature 
of the Orient is the duality of a cultivated minority and the uncultivated masses 
– leading to an autocratic form of government, which is based on the rule of one 
tribe over all the others, with the dynasty as its personification. As it is attested 
53 Béni Kállay, Magyarország Kelet és Nyugot határán (Budapest: MTA Könyvkiadó Vállalata, 1883).
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by the history of Hellenistic states, the subjected peoples did not become citizens 
– instead Alexander the Great and his successors adopted the oriental structures. 
In general, Greek civilization cannot be considered to be the spiritual basis of the 
West, as culture remained in the hand of the elite, while the masses were kept in 
subjection. In the oriental political frameworks, the powerful individual always 
over-rules the collective solidarity and therefore nothing restrains oppression, 
leaving no chance for individual liberty to develop. This is also exemplified by the 
oppression of women. Liberty can only be based on mutual self-restraint, while 
in the Orient the stronger enforces his power and the weaker forcibly retreats, 
thus democracy, even if it emerges, is easily transformed into tyranny. The 
despotic power of the minority explains the lack of patriotism in the East, which 
is a feeling based on shared rights and responsibilities, integrating the state as a 
legal and national unity. The Orient is thus marked by the lack of an integrated 
political structure and consequently the failure to form a united political nation.
In contrast, the West – rooted principally in Roman political culture – is 
characterized by constitutional development, with the plebeian element step-by-
step becoming part of the political system. This process catalyzed the emergence 
of a contractual relationship among the citizens, symbolized by the notion of 
res publica, aiming at the common good. Therefore, individual liberty was not 
weakening, but exactly strengthening the state. The main aspects of the Western 
world are thus the emergence of uniform legal systems, a state integrating the 
different classes and ethnicities, the emancipation of women and eventually the 
formation of a political nation, based not on ‘tribal’ allegiance but on identifying 
with institutions. This form of statehood is coupled by the existence of “society”, 
developing self-conscious aims, forming a powerful public opinion (in contrast to 
the East, where “public opinion” simply does not exist), marked by the permanent 
clash of different ideas, which eventually leads to a rational compromise. Based 
on this social dynamism, Western democracy is sustained by the efforts of the 
citizens to reach equality of legal status and extend their civil liberties.
In Kállay’s vision, Hungary was exactly in-between the Orient and the 
Occident. The Hungarians were originally Easterners who became very early 
transformed by Western influence. Thus, adopting Christianity and establishing 
a Western-style regnum, King Stephen successfully broke up the tribal structures 
of nationality and led his country to political integration with the West. Rather 
than envisioning some sort of primeval democracy, Kállay asserted that the 
“feudal” Middle Ages witnessed a development towards parliamentarism and 
extension of the political community which, however, was broken by the fatal 
Battle of Mohács (1526) and the ensuing disintegration of the unitary monarchy 
under the Ottoman pressure. Nevertheless, culturally Hungarians still 
participated in Occidental culture – especially by adopting the various trends of 
the Renaissance and the Reformation.
However, due mainly to the lasting social and political misery, the Hungarian 
national character remained in-between the Oriental and the Occidental types. 
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Among its principal traits one can find the resistance against influences from 
outside, less assiduousness, the desire of innovation but lack of systematic work, 
and an inclination to speculation without yielding results. Similarly, in Kállay’s 
understanding the famous “Hungarian tolerance” towards the nationalities 
was also a transitory case, as the Hungarians did not impose the oppressive 
ethnic separation typical of the East, but were also unable to create a united 
political nation as it was the rule in the West. Nevertheless, the imperfect, but 
existing Hungarian political nation was a genuinely Western formation and 
held the promise of further development towards a more encompassing civic 
nation. Along these lines, Kállay saw the essence of the Hungarian cultural and 
political mission in “mediation” – for him even the two parts of the Hungarian 
crown symbolize this duality, one being of Western and the other of Byzantine 
origin. Capable of understanding the Eastern way of thinking but eventually 
being part of the West, Hungarians are destined to transfer Western ideas 
and institutions to the Southeast-European zone, and also explain the local 
specificities of this region to the Westerners54.
Kállay’s understanding of the national mission was in many ways 
representative of the generally optimistic political and cultural atmosphere of 
the first two decades after the Ausgleich. His very radical conceptual distinction 
between nationality based on ethnic and cultural markers and political 
nationhood, although it represented the spirit of the Nationality Law of 1868, was 
becoming increasingly atypical, as most of the participants of the public sphere 
kept conflating the ethno-cultural and the political-institutional aspects. Thus, 
in different scientific and rhetoric registers, one finds various attempts to fuse 
the ethnic and historical definitions of the national community, and especially 
to re-define the ethnic (in the contemporary usage, “racial”) character of the 
nation in terms of its mission civilisatrice, extolling its capacity of assimilating 
the ethnic others throughout the centuries. This discourse reached its climax in 
the last generation of liberal nationalists dominating the scene from the 1880s 
to the turn of the century. Often stemming from assimilated families, having 
ascended into the state bureaucracy, they exemplified the power and plausibility 
of the assimilatory offer (e.g. Gy�z� Concha had Italian ancestors, Gusztáv 
Beksics came from Serbian background, while Béla Grünwald and Jen� Rákosi 
were assimilated Germans). The protagonists of this generation were all steeped 
into the positivist scientific canon, seeking to bring together personal liberty and 
organic social development. The most important modification on the liberalism 
of the previous generation proposed by these authors was the extolling of state 
intervention. They considered that an organic process of social modernization 
was only possible if the state fulfilled its regulatory functions as they did not 
consider the society sufficiently mature to initiate the reforms. The reforms and 
54 It is remarkable in this context that Kállay’s main efforts in Sarajevo were exactly aiming 
at the creation of a Bosnian “political nation”, overwriting the ethnic and denominational 
differences.
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projects for social and political integration could only come from an enlightened 
bureaucratic elite, in possession of scientific knowledge and a developed national 
consciousness, with the population envisioned as a rather formless mass to be 
“educated” and integrated into the national community.
In a way, this program was based on the master-narrative of Hungarian 
liberalism originated in the Reform Age, focusing on the “extension of rights” 
and the “elevating of the people into the nation”. What made this discourse, 
however, radically different was that in the 1830s this project did not have a 
quasi-nation-state infrastructure available to actually undertake the task of 
turning the people into a nation in the sense of ‘fabricating Hungarians’ – it 
was envisioned more in terms of extension of privileges to the population, 
which was supposed to catalyze a national identification. In the heyday of ‘neo-
liberals’ in the 1880-90s, the proliferation of non-Hungarian ethno-cultural 
identities in general came to be considered a hindrance to modernization, 
which in the vision of these theoreticians was conditioned by cultural and 
social homogeneity. The references to national character amply present in the 
writings of these authors were thus used to underpin the project of ‘national 
engineering’. A classic statement of this sort is the prominent historian and 
political scientist Gy�z� Concha’s (1846-1933) commemorative oration on the 
anniversary of the “Arad martyrs” of 184955. Concha’s overall message was that 
the “Hungarian race” (defined in terms of a fusion of ethnic and historical 
markers) proved to be capable of expanding civilization in the region throughout 
the 1000 years of the existence of the Hungarian state due to its extraordinary 
qualities of political organization and cultural creativity. In contrast, the other 
nationalities of the country are characterized as basically benevolent but 
somewhat retarded “children” (the Romanians of Transylvania, for instance, 
are described as having a “primitive character”56) in need of guidance as 
they are culturally and politically insufficient to form an autonomous polity. 
In this logic, the rule of the “Hungarian race” is legitimized with regard to 
universal human progress – the progressive features of the Hungarian liberal 
government, rooted in the progressive character of the Hungarian national 
project as such, make the suppression of ‘separatism’ and the forceful extension 
of nationality acceptable in front of the judgment of world history.
The attempts at redefining liberalism in line with a more straightforwardly 
homogenizing agenda, however, were not able to forestall the increasingly 
obvious drift between the liberal ideological tenets and the nationalist 
rhetoric and practices. There are basically two phases of this separation: until 
the turn of the century the co-existence of the Hungarian ‘imperialist’ and 
55 Gy�z� Concha, “A magyar faj hegemóniája” (1890), in A konzervatív és a liberális elv (Piliscsaba: 
Attraktor, 2005) 100-110; the “Arad martyrs” were generals of the Hungarian revolutionary 
army executed by the Austrian authorities after the surrender of the Hungarian troops in 
October 1849.
56 Concha, “A magyar faj hegemóniája”, in Concha, A konzervatív és a liberális elv, 107.
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the liberal elements were at least subjectively feasible. The 1890s saw the 
immense propaganda-campaign of a liberal project of assimilation, together 
with the nationalistic turn of the anti-Habsburg Independence Party. There 
is, however, a further shift as well: as Miklós Szabó documented it, the turn 
of the century brought a new kind of anti-liberal nationalism to fore57. While 
conservativism was anti-national for quite a long time before, this new trend 
of protectionist anti-liberalism began to forge a somewhat xenophobic version 
of the nationalist canon, drawing on the European examples of emerging anti-
liberal mass mobilization (anti-Semitism, agrarianism, Christian Socialism). 
In turn, we see the contrary process as well: the formation of a neo-liberal 
canon which was defined precisely as anti-nationalistic and which considered 
the ‘national’ gentry to be the cause of all evils58.
This development also signaled the end of the construction of ‘political 
nationhood’ and the emergence of a new vision of competing – and incompatible 
– ethno-cultural projects. While it already had strong signs at the turn of the 
century, this ideological framework, fusing the agenda of nation-state building 
with ethno-cultural homogenization, became central after the lost World War 
I and the ensuing territorial losses. Never completely abandoning the vision of 
restoring the supra-ethnic state, the Hungarian political elite thus entered an 
irresolvable dilemma, on the one hand shifting away from the idea of political 
nation towards and ethnic definition, but at the same time keeping the illusion 
of the viability of the Greater Hungarian project, defining the Hungarians as the 
natural leaders in the multi-ethnic Danubian region.
While the Hungarian national discourse after 1918 thus came to be wedged 
between an increasingly ethno-culturalist understanding and the ‘historical’ 
multi-ethnic imaginary framework, most of the other nation-building projects of 
the region (Romanian, Czechoslovak and/or Slovak, Yugoslav and/or Serbian and 
Croatian) had a trajectory towards the opposite direction: being rooted in a more 
ethnic understanding of the nation, they were experimenting with redefining 
themselves in terms of an assimilatory model. Needless to say, all these projects 
were torn by internal contradictions, leading eventually to the abandonment 
of the principle of civic equality in the name of the urgent task of national 
homogenization to prevent the impending dissolution of the nation-state. The 
clash of the Hungarian nation-building project with other similar endeavors 
in the region, which was originally catalyzed by the “non-contemporaneous 
57 Miklós Szabó, Az újkonzervativizmus és a jobboldali radikalizmus története (1867-1918) (Budapest: 
�j Mandátum, 2003).
58 On the fin-de-siècle political discourses in Hungary see Zoltán Horváth, Die Jahrhundertwende 
in Ungarn. Geschichte der zweiten Reformgeneration (1896–1914) (Budapest: Corvina, 1966); Béla 
Németh G., Létharc és nemzetiség (Budapest: Magvet�, 1976); György Litván, Magyar gondolat - 
szabad gondolat: Nacionalizmus és progresszió a századeleji Magyarországon (Budapest: Magvet�, 
1978); Péter Hanák, The Garden and the Workshop: Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and 
Budapest (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1998).
337national specificity in nineteenth century hungary
contemporaneity” of these projects and the concomitant failure to devise a 
discursive technique of accommodation, thus led to a lasting conflict and a self-
perpetuating dream-world of national ‘homogeneity’ on all sides, still poisoning 
the coexistence of titular nations and ethnic minorities (the few which survived 
the twentieth century) in East Central Europe.

